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Introduction 
 
In Australia, the provision of disability services is undergoing large-scale, systemic reform 
(COAG, 2012). The establishment of the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) is an 
important recognition by national and state governments of the essential role that 
disability services play both in enhancing the wellbeing, independence, and quality of life of 
people with disabilities, and in assisting family members and other informal carers, whose 
unpaid work provides the majority of support for people with disabilities (AIHW, 2011; 
Saraceno, 2010). The NDIS reforms aim to ensure not merely that more services will be 
available to people with disabilities, but that that those services will be high quality, 
appropriate to each individual’s needs, and efficiently run. 
In recent years, to improve outcomes for people with disabilities and the efficiency of 
services at both a user and system level, Commonwealth, State and Territory agencies have 
developed and trialled a range of market-based funding models within which ‘choice’ and 
‘control’ are key principles (COAG, 2012; Productivity Commission, 2011). Consumer-
centred funding models, including allocations of funds which are portable between 
providers, and self-managed, personal or individual budgets, are a growing part of the 
service mix. These models are likely to continue to grow as the Commonwealth expands its 
activity, and the scale of public funding, in the disability field (COAG, 2012).  
This report is concerned with the impact of consumer-centred funding models on disability 
services workers, with particular focus on their capacity to provide high quality services. 
Specifically, the report compiles research and evaluation findings about what 
individualised funding models mean for workers in disability service organisations, and for 
those whom service users directly employ or contract to provide support. We recognise 
that disability services include staff in a wide range of occupations and roles. People with 
disabilities may draw on assistance from nurses, case managers, allied health workers, 
planners, facilitators, welfare workers, as well as food and transport workers and others 
who provide personal care and therapy, social and or welfare support, respite care, and 
domestic assistance. In this report the term ‘disability support worker’ refers to this wide 
range of paid workers, while the term ‘carer’ refers to family, friends, and volunteers who 
provide informal or unpaid assistance.  
QUALITY SERVICES DEPEND ON A QUALITY WORKFORCE 
The report is premised on recognition that there are critical challenges confronting 
disability care and support in Australia, and that a high quality, high capacity and 
sustainable workforce will be essential to any solution. The Productivity Commission’s 
Inquiry into Disability Care and Support began by stating that disability services in 
Australia are underfunded, that service provision is inadequate, inequitably distributed, 
and poorly organised, that there is unmet need for support, and that there ‘appears to be a 
strong link between observed disadvantage [of people with a disability] and a lack of 
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support services’ (Productivity Commission 2011: 112). In the Commission’s view, ‘people 
with disabilities and their informal carers bear too much of the costs associated with 
disability’ (2011: 102). The scale of unmet need is significant: the ABS Survey of Disability, 
Ageing and Carers in 2009 found that more than a third of all Australians with a disability 
(36 percent) did not have their need for assistance fully met.1 Further, the extent of support 
provided by informal carers vastly exceeds that provided in the formal care system, and 
current arrangements are based on ‘an excessive and unfair reliance on the unpaid work of 
informal carers’ (Productivity Commission 2011: 105).  
The workforce is central to the way in which services are provided. They are the main 
determinant of the quality of care and the major cost of service delivery. In turn the 
outcome of system reform under the NDIS is critically dependent on how effectively the 
current workforce challenges are addressed. The benefits of supporting a workforce 
quality workforce, and developing disability services as an industry of choice, will be 
widespread. For people with disabilities, skilled and well-supported workers, employed 
with decent working conditions and job security, can ensure care is consistent, reliable, and 
responsive to clients’ choices and needs.  Skilled and well-supported workers are best 
placed to build and sustain care relationships; foster capabilities, wellbeing and 
participation; and assist individuals and their families to take more control in defining and 
meeting their support needs (Blyth & Gardner, 2007, p. 243; Carmichael & Brown, 2002, p. 
805).  Good relationships between care workers and service users reinforce users’ self-
esteem and dignity to make them feel genuinely valued and cared for, while unsatisfactory 
relationships can erode users’ self-esteem, be overly intrusive, and enforce passivity and 
dependency (Vernon & Qureshi, 2000).   
Studies link good quality services to good working conditions. An English survey for 
example collected information about service quality from 7,935 users of home care 
services, and found service users perceived service quality to be higher where workers had 
received a higher number of hours of training, where they had guaranteed working hours 
and paid travel time, where female wage rates were closer to men’s, and where workers 
had been employed in the same organisation for more than five years (Netten et al., 2007, 
p. 84).   
The quality and sustainability of the paid care workforce is also important for family 
members, friends, neighbours and others providing informal care. Access to a well 
supported, high quality paid workforce can improve trust in, and access to, the service 
system and can relieve stress among these carers, to improve their quality of life.  
The paid care workforce also matters for society more broadly, given the community and 
national economic benefits from increased health, wellbeing, and participation of people 
with disabilities, and their informal carers (Productivity Commission, 2011).  In turn, the 
                                                 
1 Authors’ calculation based on data in Table 16 of Disability, Ageing and Carers, Australia: Summary 
of Findings, 2009, Cat. 44300DO001_2009.  
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‘enablement’ and ‘restorative’ functions of good quality care have efficiency benefits by 
assisting some people to be more independent, thereby enabling funded services to be 
directed to where they are most needed.  
The capacity of the service system to implement change, and meet policy goals, depends on 
a skilled and experienced workforce.  In recent years, studies of Australia’s disability 
workforce have contributed compelling evidence that shortages of appropriately skilled 
staff are likely to constrain the system’s capacity to provide quality services in the context 
of increasing levels of demand, and that without resolving these issues, it will be difficult to 
promote consumer choice and control and facilitate the introduction of the National 
Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) (NDS, 2011; Productivity Commission, 2011). As noted 
below, employers currently find it difficult to attract and retain disability support workers. 
Without substantially improving working conditions and the capacity to recruit and retain 
skilled staff, there is little prospect that goals of national system expansion will be met.  
Without appropriate workforce planning, monitoring and regulation, it will be difficult to 
guarantee appropriate safeguards and standards of care for consumers as the system 
expands (Productivity Commission, 2011). 
AUSTRALIA’S DISABILITY SUPPORT WORKFORCE 
Individualised funding models are being introduced in a context in which workforce trends 
in the disability sector have, for many years, undermined system capacity and 
sustainability.  
As a group, disability support workers are older compared to the rest of the workforce, and 
the workforce is strongly female dominated.  A high proportion of workers have worked in 
the sector for a long period, and many will retire in the next decade. In addition, 
qualification and skill levels are relatively low, which affects the quality and variety of 
services available. A large survey found that nationally, high proportions of disability sector 
employers reported that their employees are under-skilled (Martin & Healy, 2010, p. 131).  
More than half of employers (55 percent) reported that some of their non-professional 
employees were under-skilled. Of this group, almost a third (or sixteen percent of all 
employers) reported that at least half their non-professional workforce was under-skilled 
(Martin & Healy, 2010, p. 132).  Further, there is evidence of low levels of organisational 
support for learning and development beyond mandatory courses and induction, although 
professional development opportunities appear more common among services with more 
secure funding (Fattore et al., 2010, p. 107).  
These workforce challenges are largely a result of the low levels of government investment 
in the sector, contributing to low pay, insecure working conditions, and the low status of 
disability support work. 
Wages in the disability sector are low, and, compared with the general workforce, a high 
proportion of workers depend on industrial awards (Productivity Commission, 2011, pp. 
698-699).  Mean hourly wage rates have been found to be around 13 percent less in 
disability services than the average among all female employees, with the lowest wages 
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concentrated in the non-government sector, reflecting the effects of widespread 
outsourcing in recent years (Martin & Healy, 2010, p. 119). This is important, given the 
likely concentration of future employment in disability services in the private, rather than 
the public, sector. 
Casualisation is a major structural feature of the workforce. Martin and Healy showed that 
among non-professional workers in the disability service sector (a group which includes 
personal carers, home care workers, community care workers, and disability or residential 
support workers), almost a third (31 percent) were employed on a casual basis (2010, p. 
145), but only half as many preferred this arrangement (2010, p. 144).  Among non-
professional disability service workers, casual employment contracts were most prevalent 
in the non-government sector: 35 percent of non-government sector non-professionals 
worked casually, compared to 11 percent of public sector non-professional disability 
workers (Martin & Healy, 2010, pp. 112-113).  Short shifts were also found to be common, 
and over a quarter of non-professional workers reported wanting to increase their working 
hours (Martin & Healy, 2010).  
People with disabilities and their carers consider these issues to be significant problems in 
their lives, especially workers’ lack of training, low pay, and inadequate understanding of 
disability issues (National People with Disabilies and Carer Council, 2009).  The 
consultations to inform the development of a National Disability Strategy, for example, 
confirmed that people with disabilities want policy makers to recognise the importance of 
the paid care workforce to meeting their needs, and the need for better employment 
conditions and rates of pay; education, training, and skills; and career pathways (Maher, 
2003; National People with Disabilies and Carer Council, 2009).   
THE PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT 
The report discusses approaches to consumer-centred funding, and based on a review of 
the literature, identifies some associated risks. As we show, under various models of 
consumer-centred funding, payment adequacy interacts with expenditure rules and 
employment standards to create an array of risk profiles for service users, employers and 
support workers. As such, the implications for people with disabilities, their support 
workers, and the quality of care that can be provided depends on the precise structure and 
context of models adopted.   
The report does not aim to provide a full taxonomy of possible funding models and issues. 
Rather, it identifies the characteristics of models which have been implemented in England 
and Australia, and explores issues and challenges which have been found to arise for paid 
workers, and which affect the quality and sustainability of the care they can provide.  The 
models we examine are: Direct Payments and Individualised Budgets in England, and 
programs in Western Australia and Victoria, which are well-developed in an Australian 
context (COAG, 2012).  The English examples exemplify market-driven approaches which 
have resulted in largely unregulated markets of personal assistants directly employed or 
contracted by consumers, and much instability for support workers employed in 
organisations.  Direct payment models, and direct employment, have been more 
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circumscribed in Australia, although recent reforms in Victoria, and the launch of the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme, may facilitate rapid growth in direct employment 
and contracting.  
In analysing evidence of the implications of various funding models, we have identified 
important limitations in the evidence base. Few research and evaluation studies have 
involved disability support workers themselves, or been designed with methodologies 
intended to capture their experiences of, or perspectives on, providing quality consumer-
centred care.  Notwithstanding these limitations, the report identifies a series of issues 
which may compromise disability support workers’ capacity to provide quality services, 
and the safety and security of people with disabilities, and their carers.  These issues relate 
to workers’ job security; income security; opportunities to use, retain and develop skills; 
health and safety; and access to voice and representation.   
Based on the analysis, the concluding section outlines some principles to guide policy and 
program development in ways that can promote service quality and sustainability in the 
context of consumer-centred care. The findings suggest standards of care for consumers 
may be best safeguarded where: 
 arrangements that involve both direct employment of workers by people with 
disabilities, and contracting (rather than employment) models are carefully 
managed or avoided; 
 overall levels of government funding and payments to consumers and service 
provider organisations are sufficient to support a decent income and safe working 
conditions; 
 workers are supported to upgrade and develop their skills; 
 there is a properly resourced strategy to build workforce capacity and 
sustainability, resulting from genuine collaboration between government and 
sector stakeholders.   
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Models of individualised funding 
 
Individualised funding refers to a range of approaches to implementing personalised, self-
directed, or consumer-centred care.  Across the various models is a common assumption 
that consumer choice and control over resources will help overcome welfare paternalism, 
improve efficiency, and promote the autonomy, independence, inclusion, rights and 
citizenship of people with a disability (Glendinning, 2008). As such, these models aim to 
shape service delivery more directly through the market signals arising from consumer 
demand; to empower people with a disability to develop their own goals and demand 
higher standards of services; and to stimulate innovation to expand the range of supports 
available.   
Although goals of consumer-centred care can be achieved by increasing the voice of service 
users within provider organisations or increasing the capacity for organisations to meet 
service user needs, there has been a recent proliferation in programs providing service 
users with funds to directly purchase their own care. In the United Kingdom, market 
models have introduced consumerist principles in long-term care for people with a 
disability and the elderly, through direct payments and individualised budgets. 
In Australia, states and territories have trialled various models under different pilot 
programs, although direct employment by consumers has so far been more circumscribed 
than in the United Kingdom. All states and territories have programs incorporating forms 
of consumer-directed funding in place (COAG, 2012). However, Western Australia is the 
most advanced in enabling clients to control service delivery, while Victoria has taken a 
more strongly market-oriented approach, including through the state-wide roll out of 
direct employment (COAG, 2012; Fattore et al., 2010).   
Although models of individualised funding have mutual priorities of facilitating consumer 
choice and control and obtaining cost efficiencies, there is much variation in approach 
(Carr & Robbins, 2009).  This variation reflects the inconsistent way individualised funding 
policies have spread internationally. As Boxall et al (2010) point out, rather than being 
adopted according to a coherent set of ideas, rational accumulation of evidence, and 
assessment of relevance to local circumstances, these policies have tended to spread by 
bureaucrats adopting selected ideas, with positive case studies diverting attention from the 
potential problems, and strategies for resolving them (Boxall et al., 2009, pp. 507-508). 
As such, models of direct funding have differed significantly in terms of their aims and 
structure, and the context in which they were introduced.  Models have different rules 
about who is eligible; who can hold and manage the funds; the forms of support that 
funding can be used for; how providers are regulated; whether and under what conditions 
recipients can directly employ staff; whether they can purchase services from family 
members; and the role of intermediary organisations in managing funds and/or giving 
support and advice to users (COAG, 2012; Fisher et al., 2010). Models also differ in terms of 
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the existence and extent of workforce planning and development in the broader policy 
framework. 
Alongside these dimensions, the adequacy of individualised payments – the extent to which 
the size of payments enable recipients to fully meet their needs – is also an essential and 
variable feature of the design and operation of these schemes. Where payments are 
inadequate, recipients who purchase labour for intensive forms of support, such as 
personal assistance or attendant care, may face trade-offs between the rate of pay they can 
offer, the number of hours of support they can purchase, and the quality of the support 
worker (in terms of skills and experience) they can afford to engage. Payment adequacy 
interacts with expenditure rules and employment standards to create an array of risk 
profiles for service users and support workers. Where expenditure rules and employment 
standards are weak, and payments low, support workers can be at risk of exploitation.  
Here we analyse models of funding in England, and in two Australian states, with a focus on 
these issues, both in terms of how the programs have been designed and how they have 
been actually used by recipients. First, we examine the system of direct payments in place 
in England between 1997 and 2006, and the trial and implementation of individual, or 
personal budgets that followed.  We then outline two models of consumer-centred care in 
Australia, examining arrangements in Western Australia and Victoria, the states with the 
most extensive experience of individualised approaches (COAG, 2012). 
 
INDIVIDUALISED FUNDING IN ENGLAND 
The development of individualised funding 
In the United Kingdom, demands for cash payments arose from a number of sources, 
notably from philosophies of self-determination and independent living, especially among 
people with physical and sensory disabilities; from social (rather than medical) models of 
disability2; and from the convergence between welfare service users’ critique of inadequate 
services and the politics of the new right’s attempts to dismantle state provision (Spandler, 
2004). Cash payments to support individuals with disabilities living at home were first 
made under the Independent Living Fund established in 1988, but direct payment 
programs have expanded most rapidly in the last decade, especially after policy made it 
mandatory for local authorities to offer direct payments to eligible consumers from 2003 
(Riddell et al., 2005).   
Individual Budgets were made available from 2006, combining a series of funding 
programs into one, and relaxing rules about how funds could be spent. Across this period, 
                                                 
2 Social models relate disability to barriers to inclusion, rather than individual impairment, and 
emphasise the supports people with disabilities require in order to live on more equal terms 
with non-disabled people (Boxall et al., 2009). 
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individualised payments have been offered to an increasing number of groups of social 
service users, in what has been described as a ‘wholesale implementation’ with ‘no 
international precedent’ (Boxall et al., 2009). 
Workforce planning and strategy and the English reform agenda 
In the roll out of policies in England, the adult social care workforce has had status on the 
national agenda, with a series of national policy documents articulating the importance of 
workforce planning and development to achieving the goals of personalisation.  England’s 
strategy for increasing users’ choice and control in adult social care for example, 
incorporated a workforce strategy: ‘Working to Put People First: The Strategy for the Adult 
Social Care Workforce in England’ (Department of Health, 2009).  This document set a 
vision of “a confident, enabled and equipped social care workforce” which supported the 
cultural shift associated with the personalisation agenda (Department of Health, 2009, p. 
17), and articulated priorities around workforce planning, promoting recruitment, 
retention and career pathways, remodelling the workforce around personalised services, 
developing the skills and diversity of the workforce, promoting integrated working, and 
regulating for quality standards and safety.  Through Skills for Care, the UK government has 
also established a workforce development strategy for adult social care (Skills for Care, 
2011) and a personal assistant framework and implementation plan (Skills for Care, 2012), 
as well as good practice case studies and other resources. However, as the discussion below 
shows, outcomes for workers appear to be more strongly shaped by the processes of 
marketisation associated with funding reforms than the aspirational goals of these policy 
initiatives.  
 
DIRECT PAYMENTS 
Background and Context 
Direct payments were introduced in England, Wales and Scotland in legislation that took 
effect in 1997, and a year later in Northern Ireland.  This gave local authorities 
discretionary power to offer adults with a disability who were eligible for social care the 
option to access means-tested cash payments in lieu of services. These payments could be 
used to purchase services from the private or voluntary sector to meet assessed needs, and 
were intended to give service users choice and control over how their needs were met.  
Direct Payments: Who accessed the funds? 
Under direct payments from 1997, local authorities could offer cash payments to adults 
aged 18-65 with a sensory impairment, physical or learning disabilities and some people 
with mental health problems.  Eligibility was also expanded to include people aged over 65 
(in 2000), young people aged 16 and 17 with a disability and parents of disabled children 
(in 2001). In 2003 new regulations came into force that removed local authority discretion 
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and made it mandatory for councils to offer direct payments to all people using community 
care.  
Take-up was lower than expected, and there was much variation between regions, and 
among groups with different needs (Davey et al., 2007; Priestley et al., 2007). Those with 
conditions which were stable over time, such as physical and sensory impairments for 
example, were found most likely to take up a direct payment, and to use the payment 
successfully, while uptake was lower, and more difficult among people with mental health 
problems, and the elderly (Davey et al., 2007; Land & Himmelweit, 2010; Riddell et al., 
2005).  
How direct payments could be spent 
Direct payments could be used to purchase care services from personal assistants (workers 
providing one-to-one support, under the direction of the consumer), or from private or 
voluntary sector providers, but not from municipal social service departments.  Most often, 
direct payments were used to directly employ personal assistants.  Initially, direct 
payments could not be used to employ a family member. However, in 2003, policy changed 
to allow direct payment holders to employ non-resident family members, although 
conditions for doing so varied between local authority. One study based on a sample survey 
of 526 Direct Payment employers of personal assistants in 16 local authorities in 2007 
found that close to half employed people they already knew. Of these, around a third 
employed family or friends (31 percent), and around a fifth employed persons who had 
assisted them before they received a Direct Payment (20 percent) (Adams & Godwin, 2008; 
Manthorpe et al., 2011).   
Adequacy of payments 
Consumers employing personal assistants directly have reported that the total amount of 
money received through direct money was insufficient to meet their support needs.  Adams 
and Godwin (2008, p. 47) reported that 43 percent of employers felt the local authority 
assessment underestimated the amount of assistance they required. The majority (64 
percent) believed their needs were underestimated by under ten hours a week. However, a 
significant proportion (15 percent) reported a shortfall of more than 20 hours.  This 
shortfall had implications for the hourly wage rates offered to personal assistants (Adams 
& Godwin, 2008, p. 47).  The funding shortfall also had implications for training. Indeed, the 
most frequent reason that recipients of direct payments reported being unwilling to pay for 
external training for the personal assistants they employed was that they could not spare 
the money, suggesting low payment rates undermined skill development (Adams & 
Godwin, 2008, p. 105).   
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INDIVIDUALISED BUDGETS 
Background and context 
In 2006, the UK government piloted an Individual Budget scheme, built on the direct 
payments system and a model previously developed by the social enterprise ‘In Control’ 
(Glendinning et al., 2008). The idea behind Individual Budgets was to give an allocation of 
resources to service users in lieu of care, from which they could meet their self-assessed 
needs. In the process, individualised budgets also pooled previously separate streams of 
health and social services funding to which individuals were entitled (Carr & Robbins, 
2009). Overall, the intention was that budget holders would shape social care markets 
through their purchasing decisions, and would access more integrated services, and a 
wider range of services.  
In 2010, the UK government (Department of Health, 2010) sought to expand the 
availability of individual budgets (also called personal budgets), setting the target that by 
April 2013, all councils would provide personal budgets for eligible adult social care users.  
Individualised Budgets: Who accesses and manages the funds? 
Budgets can be taken as cash payments to individuals, or held and deployed by care 
managers, a trust, or a service provider or another third party (Carr & Robbins, 2009).  If 
direct payments are used, not all the budget is necessarily taken in this way.  Individual 
consumers are required to develop plans as to how they will meet personal outcomes, and 
can purchase support to meet these needs from private or voluntary sector services, or 
friends or family members.  Support in planning and brokering supports comes from care 
managers, social workers, other agencies, or informal carers. As of March 2011, one third of 
local authority supported service users received an Individual Budget, and plans were in 
place for every service user to have a budget by 2013, with most growth expected among 
people receiving budgets managed by councils, rather than by individuals (Wilberforce et 
al., 2012).  
How Individualised Budgets can be spent 
Individual Budgets went further than Direct Payments in facilitating personalisation, in 
that holders could use the cash payments to purchase any goods or services that could be 
shown to meet their assessed needs.  As well as hiring personal assistants or purchasing 
other domestic assistance, funds could be used for leisure and social activities, and service 
users could select providers other than those engaged in contracts with local authorities 
(Wilberforce et al., 2011).  Social care professionals have a clear role in assisting service 
users to make decisions, to support them to assess their needs, or have their needs 
assessed, to help allocate resources, to manage risks in service users lives, and to support 
planning and brokerage.   
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Adequacy of payments 
The evaluation of the pilots of Individual Budgets found that for older people at least, the 
funding available was only enough to meet basic functional needs. As such, older people 
spent their payments predominantly on personal care, with little money leftover for social 
or leisure activities. As such, the funding continued to be spent on direct care, and often on 
maintaining pre-existing arrangements, rather than purchasing goods and services from 
outside the sector (Moran et al., 2012).  
 
INDIVIDUALISED FUNDING IN AUSTRALIA 
In Australia, individualised funding has been implemented in various ways in most of the 
states and territories, and while many programs have been small-scale trials (Productivity 
Commission, 2011), they are rapidly expanding.  Implementation of personalised planning 
and individualised funding is most developed in Western Australia, where direct payments 
to some people with a disability have been available for more than twenty years, although 
the emphasis has been on facilitating control over service planning and delivery, rather 
than facilitating direct employment. Recognising the State’s established arrangements for 
self-directed disability support, the Productivity Commission (2011) recommended that 
the National Disability Insurance Scheme incorporate elements of that state’s system, 
although key structural elements of the NDIS are yet to be determined (COAG, 2012). In the 
last few years, Victoria has also led the states in trialling direct payments (Fisher et al, 
2010; Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D.4; COAG, 2012), and since December 2012, 
these payments have been allowed to be spent on directly employing support staff (COAG, 
2012).  The following sections explore the model of individualised funding in these two 
states.  
WESTERN AUSTRALIA 
Background and Context 
Western Australian disability services have a well established focus on promoting 
consumers’ abilities to make decisions about how funding is directed. There are two main 
programs.  
One, the Local Area Coordination (LAC) program, has operated across Western Australia 
since 1988, in part because the small population spread over vast distance was perceived 
to make provision of standard services impossible (Disability Services Commission, 2003).  
Under this program, local area coordinators work with family members and others to assist 
people with a disability to plan and organise their services and to participate in the 
community (DPRWG, 2011). A small minority of LAC program recipients (around 18 
percent in 2009) receive a direct payment with which they purchase support services, 
rather than relying on the coordination, advocacy and community participation that were 
the goals of the scheme (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D6-D7).  
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Under the second, main program, since 2005 the Disability Services Commission (DSC) has 
provided ‘individually tied funding’ to all people with a disability to meet their needs for 
most specialised disability services, including accommodation support. In this program, 
funding is based on individual assessment and planning, and funding is portable between 
service providers.  Local Area Coordinators play a key role in coordinating services 
purchased under the main DSC individual budget program, including providing support in 
applying for funds.  
Service users develop a funding plan, in collaboration with an agency they have selected. 
The Disability Services Commission provides this organisation with a loading of between 
15 and 21 percent above the direct care funding amount to support this administrative 
function (Fattore et al., 2010, p. 39; Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D.6). This has been 
perceived to guarantee a level of service capacity, which is necessary for developing 
workforce (Fattore et al., 2010).   
Portability is underwritten by government, to secure the viability of service provision 
(Fattore et al., 2010). In accommodation support for example, where service users move 
between providers, the Disability Services Commission considers the viability of remaining 
funding of other residents, and funding can be increased to maintain service continuity.  In 
addition, some training costs are paid for by the Disability Services Commission, with 
service establishment funding provided to cover orientation and induction (Fattore et al., 
2010, pp. 52-53). 
It is important to note that in 2011-12 nearly one third of operational expenditure by the 
DSC was internal, with the remaining two thirds disbursed to disability services 
organisations. Further, two thirds of people receiving some DSC funded services received 
some (34 percent) or all (28 percent) of those services from the commission itself. Less 
than two fifths (38 percent) received all their services from a disability sector organisation. 
These latter figures do not take into account service intensity, as the DSC’s annual report 
notes when reporting them. But they give some sense of the quite significant extent to 
which users will continue to rely on careworkers employed by organisations and the 
possible scale of resources that will need to be organised on a consumer-directed basis.  
Who accesses and manages the funds? 
Individually tied funding can be allocated by the Disability Services Commission to people 
with intellectual, psychiatric, cognitive, neurological, sensory, or physical impairment that 
manifest before they are 65 years old (Disability Services Commission, 2012, p. 6-7). Rather 
than a direct payment, there is a notional allocation of funding for an individual; the 
primary goal of the program is that individuals should be able to direct spending to meet 
their assessed needs (COAG, 2012, p. 20). Accordingly, all arrangements for managing 
individually tied funding involve an intermediary organisation, with management of funds 
on a continuum in which service users can choose to have more control to one in which 
they select an agency to receive the budget and deliver the service (Productivity 
Commission 2011, p. D4).  
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Service users who want significant involvement in directing the spending of individually 
tied funding allocated to them, for example, can opt for ‘shared management’. Under this 
arrangement, their chosen service provider takes on administrative responsibilities, 
thereby reducing the burden of fully arranging and managing their own care (Fisher et al., 
2010; Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D.5).  Shared management is argued to give 
people with a disability scope to design and control their own services, but with the 
support of organisations engaged to ensure legal requirements are met, including paying 
care workers and paying tax, arranging insurance, workers compensation, and paying 
superannuation. Agency-management or shared management is considered appropriate for 
the most complex self-managed clients (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D. 7).  
How individualised budgets can be spent 
Regardless of whether consumers fully manage their funds or have a service provider 
manage them, Western Australian policy intends that the consumer will control how the 
funding is spent. Direct employment of support workers is allowed, under the Local Area 
Coordination program, but as noted above, this option is used by only small proportion of 
the LAC service users. Consumers must take on all the legal responsibilities of an employer, 
and meet accountability requirements (Productivity Commission, 2010, p. D.7).  Levels of 
compliance with these requirements are at present unclear. 
Only in exceptional circumstances can family members be employed as paid support 
workers.  Western Australia has a well-reasoned formal policy which allows consumers to 
employ family members only where alternative supports are unavailable (discussed in 
more detail below). This may include situations where the person with a disability has 
cultural requirements that formal services cannot meet; where they live in an isolated or 
remote location with no alternative supports available; and/or where there are not other 
suitable alterative when all other options have been considered (Disability Services 
Commission, 2012b). 
The role of intermediaries in facilitating choice and control 
Intermediary organisations are available to support clients to exercise choice and control, 
and where they choose to be direct employers, they gain assistance in this role. These 
agencies can help clients set up legal entities to employ and pay staff, who could include a 
neighbour or somebody else chosen by the person. In addition, they can help recruit, train 
and pay staff on consumers’ behalf. This assistance is offered by the organisation ‘My Place’, 
for example.  
Employment and contracting models in the WA system 
There is a range of employment and contracting models through which support workers 
can be engaged by people with disabilities in Western Australia, with assistance from an 
intermediary organisation. ‘My Place’ lists these options on their website, which is our 
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source here.3 One option is for the person with a disability (or a family member) to become 
the legal employer of the support worker(s). Further, as the ‘My Place’ website states:  
“An advantage of people with disability (or a family member) being the 
employer is that, under certain conditions, carers can be employed under 
‘private and domestic’ arrangements which offers greater flexibility in carer 
pay levels, conditions and hours of work as the carer is not deemed to be an 
‘employee’ in the traditional legal sense.” 
People who receive individual budgets can also engage support workers as ‘independent 
contractors’, on the basis that these arrangements may enable people with disabilities to 
form flexible arrangements with their carers, while minimising their legal responsibilities 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D.5).4   
Alternatively, the client can defer all service coordination, financial and administrative 
functions to the intermediary organisation, or all of these tasks plus service delivery and 
design (PC, 2011: D.5-6).  As such, support workers can be employed by intermediary 
organisations rather than directly by service users.  
Recent developments 
In November 2012, Western Australia started ‘My Way’, a three year program established 
in four locations. In these four areas, all people with a disability in will be eligible for 
funding and support, which will involve developing individual plans to identify, select and 
design their own supports and services. This approach, which enhances features of the LAC 
program, was recommended by the WA State Government Economic Audit Committee in its 
2009 report (Economic Audit Committee, 2009). My Way Coordinators perform a similar 
function as Local Area Coordinators in other sites, but are based in the non-government as 
well as government sectors, and have a lower client load, to increase capacity to plan 
individualised responses (Disability Services Commission, undated).  My Way also provides 
more opportunities for consumers to actively manage their spending, with a continuum 
offered from self-management to complete agency management (Disability Services 
Commission, undated). Evidence as to the impact of My Way is not yet available.  
Adequacy of payments 
We are not aware of any studies about the adequacy of payments for disability support in 
Western Australia. The DSC’s annual report for 2011-12 reports average per-person cost in 
                                                 
3 See http://www.myplace.org.au/services/index.html 
4 Note however, that where the work that disability support workers do is controlled by their 
employer, and where they work the hours told by their employer, arrangements may be illegal 
‘sham’ contracts (Fair Work Ombudsman, undated). Neither the extent of contracting, nor the 
extent of sham contracting, are evident. 
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several program areas (Disability Services Commission, 2012a). Although total spending is 
rising quickly, there is no right to a service and there is some evidence of rationing of funds. 
Information for potential applicants includes the warning ‘Only applications indicating the 
most critical need are likely to be supported’.5 The DSC annual report for 2011-12 reported 
that of 595 applicants for funding under the accommodation support funding stream 207, 
or 35 percent, were successful. Application numbers and success rates in other funding 
streams were not reported. It remains an open question whether those who receive an 
allocation are adequately funded. Interestingly, one of the human interest ‘case studies’ 
presented in the report describes how a family with a child with a disability found funds for 
a wheelchair accessible vehicle largely from community fundraising (a ‘monster garage 
sale’), and private donations. Of the $50,000 raised, a maximum of $7,500 came from the 
DSC itself, via the Independent Living Centre it funds (2012, p. 32). In this way, the sense 
that charity still has an essential role in funding supports for people with disabilities is 
clearly communicated. 
VICTORIA 
Background and Context 
Victoria’s Disability State Plan 2002-2012 emphasised the development and expansion of 
self-directed approaches.  Early examples of flexible funding packages were available in the 
early 1990s, but Individual Support Packages (ISPs) were first offered in 2003, under the 
‘Support and Choice’ program which provided flexible funding for families with a child with 
a disability.  Administered by the Department of Human Services, ISPs have since been 
expanded to provide flexible funding to a wider range of service users.  As of mid-2012, 
over 14000 people accessed individualised funding in Victoria, and in late 2012, 30 per 
cent of Victoria’s total disability budget was spent as individualised funding (COAG, 2012). 
Who accesses and manages the funds? 
Currently, ISPs are available to people with long-term sensory, physical or neurological 
impairments; intellectual disabilities or developmental delays. ISPs are intended to give 
consumers control over budgets to meet their needs and goals. At present, those receiving 
ISPs have a number of options. They can receive direct payments in a separate bank 
account, from which they pay invoices; or the ISP can be held by a government-contracted 
financial intermediary, which pays invoices and keeps records on behalf of the client; or a 
registered disability service provider can hold the funds, maintain records, provide the 
bulk of services, and act as an agent to purchase services from other agencies (Productivity 
Commission, 2011, p. D.9).  People who use intermediaries or service providers can move 
between them, but a period of notice, set by the provider, must be given. This period of 
                                                 
5  See 
http://www.disability.wa.gov.au/Global/Publications/Services%20supports%20and%20eligibi
lity/Funding/combined_application_process_brochure_-_english_(id_372_ver_2.0.0).pdf 
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notice allows organisations time to adjust, to find new service users, and manage funding 
and rostering, to protect service continuity and employment standards. 
How individualised budgets can be spent 
In Victoria, the ISPs cannot be used for entertainment or other things normally purchased 
from income, except where they are necessary for social, health or wellbeing outcomes, and 
where they can be provided more cheaply by a mainstream service than by a specialised 
disability service (Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D.9). Until December 2012, direct 
employment was not allowed: staff needed to be employed by service providers.  Non-
resident family members, or staff recruited through informal networks, could be used. 
However, these workers needed to be employed through accredited disability agencies, 
who took on responsibility for ensuring all training, safety and occupational health and 
safety requirements were met, and that all entitlements were paid, as for other employees 
(Laragy & Ottmann, 2011; Productivity Commission, 2011, p. D.9).   
Adequacy of payments 
There is no clear evidence as to the adequacy of payments, although the adequacy of unit 
prices has previously been a contentious issue in the sector, with some service providers 
struggling to offer services within the unit cost parameters (Victorian Auditor-General, 
2011). Current unit prices paid by the Department of Human Services for commonly used 
Individual Support Package services are published on the DHS website, including (from 1 
December 2012) $38.82 per hour for in home one to one personal support, $51.57 per hour 
for complex case management. For therapy services, the unit price ranged from $33.01 for 
therapy with an unqualified assistant, to $37.04 for a qualified assistant, and $71.59 per 
hour for a professional therapeutic service.  Current unit costs include provision for 
training (Department of Human Services, 2011).   
Recent developments in Victoria: The expansion of Direct Employment 
Since December 2012, ISP recipients across Victoria have been allowed to use funds to 
directly employ their own support staff. The Victorian Department of Human Services 
announced the expansion of direct employment  following a small-scale trial of direct 
employment, and its evaluation (Department of Human Services, 2011; HDG Consulting, 
2010).  Under this new system, ISP recipients can choose who to employ, and as employers, 
they carry legal, financial and human resource management obligations, including for 
recruiting staff, negotiating conditions, training workers, paying workers, paying for 
insurance and taxation, and handling performance issues.  As such, this model differs from 
the alternatives of engaging staff as contractors, using support staff employed by host 
agencies, and establishing separate legal entities, such as companies or cooperatives to act 
as employer (HDG Consulting, 2010).   
The Department of Human Services has created a ‘direct employment resource guide’ to 
assist ISP recipients who elect to employ their own support workers, which outlines their 
obligations and responsibilities with respect to recruitment processes, pre-employment 
21 
 
checks, pay and conditions, taxation, insurance, occupational health and safety, anti-
discrimination legislation, termination of employment, and record keeping. Among the 
resources are a sample application form, contract of employment, position description and 
a summary of the minimum pay and conditions under the Social, Community, Home Care 
and Disability Services Industry Award 2010 (Department of Human Services, 2012). 
Evidence as to the impact of the state-wide roll-out of direct employment is not yet 
available.  However, the evaluation of the trial which (upon which expansion of the model 
was based) found it was successful for service users and workers.  However, this involved 
interviews with only a small number of self-selecting participants: eleven ISP recipients, 
and seven support staff (HDG Consulting Group, 2010).  Further, it should be recognised 
that participants in the trial appear to have been among the best positioned to benefit from 
direct employment, in that all reported having previous professional or other experience, 
such as bookkeeping, accounting, or business ownership, that helped them to perform the 
employer role effectively (HDG Consulting, 2010, p. 25). 
Concerns are emerging about developments in Victoria. In a forum regarding service 
provision to children with disabilities and their families held in November 2012, a range of 
important specific risks of individualised funding and support were raised. These included 
the loss of coherence and collaboration that could arise when ‘a plethora of individual 
therapists’ work with a child, without collegial and professional coordination {NDS, 2012 
#192}.  
Transition planning and workforce strategy 
Recognising the workforce challenges likely to be raised with the introduction of the 
National Disability Insurance Scheme, National Disability Services Victoria developed a 
Workforce Strategy, as part of the Victorian Disability Services Transition Plan (NDS, 
2011).  This outlines the importance of training and capacity building to ensure the skills, 
knowledge and behaviours of support workers are consistent with self-directed 
approaches; of ensuring policy and regulatory settings facilitate attractive jobs and a 
workforce that is responsive but not insecure; and ensuring the sector can maintain and 
strengthen its commitment to skill development under the NDIS (NDS, 2011). 
Summary 
The above analysis has provided some examples of how models of consumer-centred care 
can be structured.  In England, market-based funding models for adult social care have 
been pursued in an advanced way. Despite formal recognition of the importance of the 
workforce to service quality (Department of Health, 2009; Skills for Care, 2011), consumer-
centred funding models have contributed to the development of a poorly regulated market 
for personal assistants.  The implications of this are discussed in the following sections. 
Within Australia, the Western Australian and Victorian models are considered most well 
developed. Neither approach has so far resulted in the level of marketisation evident in 
England, although evidence as to the impact of both systems is lacking. In Western 
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Australia, the emphasis of personalisation appears to be on planning and designing 
services, and exercising choice and control through a notional allocation of funds that is 
portable between services, rather than seeking to facilitate direct employment.  Western 
Australia also has a funding base to support organisational capacity, which may help 
mitigate risks for workers employed in organisations.  In addition, Western Australian 
policy restricts the employment of family members to exceptional circumstances only. 
However, the possibility of using ‘private and domestic’ arrangements to engage support 
workers outside regular workplace relations safeguards presents substantial risk.  In 
Victoria, individual packages are accounting for a significant proportion of disability 
spending. However, not all these funds are direct payments, some are held by service 
providers or other intermediaries. Significant features of Victorian arrangements include 
the radical state-wide expansion of direct employment, predicated on very limited 
evidence of positive outcomes for either service users or support workers.  To support 
sector capacity in the transition to person-centred care, the state-wide transition plan 
includes a workforce strategy (NDS, 2011).  
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Workforce implications of individualised funding  
 
In this section we examine evidence of how individualised funding has impacted on the 
disability services workforce, and support workers’ capacity to offer consumers high 
quality care. As outlined in the previous section, models of individualised funding vary in 
terms of a number of factors, including which groups of consumers are eligible, how 
payments can be used, and whether they can be used to directly employ staff.  As such, the 
impact of individualised funding could be expected to be different in different contexts, 
with a specific set of issues and challenges arising where workers are directly employed or 
contracted by consumers.  
LIMITATIONS IN THE EVIDENCE BASE 
Evidence about the implications of individualised funding for workers is limited, as most 
research in the area has focused primarily on outcomes for users and their families, and 
few studies have involved and captured the perspectives of care workers (Christensen, 
2012; Glendinning, 2012; Manthorpe et al., 2011; Spandler, 2004). Further, much of the 
evidence about workforce implications comes from research and evaluation studies 
conducted prior to, during, or soon after implementation, and as such, may not clearly 
distinguish anticipated, transitional or longer-term problems.  Further, questions of 
workforce implications, and methods which include frontline workers, have been low 
priorities for research.  
Empirical evidence about workforce issues is thus limited to studies focused primarily on 
the experiences of service users and their families, or which capture issues for workers 
from the perspectives of service managers or policy officials.  In conducting a scoping study 
of direct employment by adults with disabilities and long-term health conditions, for 
example, Manthorpe et al. (2011: 202) captured many of the problems of the UK evidence 
base:  
“few studies looked in depth at the employment relationship from the 
perspective of care and support workers, especially where the employee was a 
family member... At best, employment relationships and the significance of 
them were marginal considerations in many studies and reports; others had 
small samples or were unclear about their sources of evidence. Furthermore, 
there was some difficulty in establishing whether some authors meant family 
members giving informal care, or paid care and support workers, when using 
the term ‘carer’” (Manthorpe et al., 2011, p. 202) 
Our review confirmed that these problems are also evident in the small number of 
Australian studies in the field. Ottman, Laragy and Haddon (2009) for example captured 
the experiences of directly employing support staff, but the study included only 12 families 
caring for a child or an adult son or daughter with a disability living at home.  Fisher and 
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colleagues (2010) captured some perceived workforce challenges associated with direct 
funding, but this was based on the issues anticipated in interviews with a small number of 
policy makers in some states. The evaluation of the direct employment trial in Victoria 
(HDG, 2010), which the Victorian government has used to rapidly facilitate direct 
employment of support staff (Department of Human Services, 2011) included the 
perspectives of only seven workers, and eleven consumers.   
Recognising that there are profound limitations in the evidence base, this section analyses 
the best available information about the impact of individualised funding on the workforce.  
First, we examine evidence as to the implications for workers employed in service provider 
organisations.  Many of the risks for organisationally employed workers arise from the 
challenges facing employer organisations in the context of consumer choice and control, in 
particular, increasingly unpredictable patterns of demand, demands for more flexible 
services, and increasing administrative and transaction costs. In the absence of adequate 
funding, employers may attempt to pass the costs and risks they face onto workers, 
resulting in lower pay, reduced hours and job security, inadequate training, and health and 
safety risks.  Second, we examine the implications of individualised funding on workers 
directly employed or contracted by consumers, including where assistance is purchased 
from family and friends. However, in examining the risks for workers employed by 
organisations and those employed by consumers separately, we recognise these groups are 
not mutually exclusive, as staff may move between consumer and agency employment, or 
may simultaneously work for consumers and organisations. 
 
WORKERS IN ORGANISATIONS 
Literature from England highlights how individualised funding, both in the direct payments 
and individual budgets models, can result in the shifting of risk from employers to workers.   
Pressures on Service Provider Organisations 
In large, these risks and challenges have been perceived to arise from pressures on 
organisations, including compromises to viability and stability resulting from changing and 
uncertain patterns of demand for their services, and the costs associated with increased 
administration (Baxter, Wilberforce, et al., 2011). In turn this has led to greater financial 
and operational uncertainty and a lower capacity to plan, including planning for 
recruitment and training needs (Baxter, Wilberforce, et al., 2011). 
 Uncertainty about demand for services from organisations 
In the UK, prior to the direct payment system, block funding from local authorities specified 
the amount of services to be delivered to multiple users over a given period, and so 
provided organisations with a level of security that allowed them to employ staff in the 
longer term, and invest in training and workforce development (Baxter, Glendinning, et al., 
2011).  Service providers largely expected the shift to cash payments to undermine their 
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viability and sustainability, by reducing demand for the formal care services they provide, 
which would increase their unit costs, as the economies of scale associated with large 
government contracts would be lost (Glendinning, 2012:296).  Service commissioners and 
managers expected demand for some services, such as day centre services, to drop 
substantially, as service users instead opted to use their funding to hire personal assistants, 
or to participate in other activities.  Similarly, in Australia, government officials in Victoria 
anticipated that in the expansion of self-directed funding, consumers would choose to shift 
portable funds away from disability service providers, and use them to access mainstream 
services, such as a local gym (Fisher et al, 2010).  
Evidence to substantiate concerns about falling demand for formal care services in the 
United Kingdom has been mixed (Wilberforce et al., 2011). The evaluation of the Individual 
Budget pilots found, for example, that take-up of personal budgets by some groups was 
low, with older people the least likely to ask for changes in their services. For these groups, 
care organisations retained significant roles as service providers (Baxter et al., 2010; 
Wilberforce et al., 2011). Where individual budget holders continued with pre-existing 
service arrangements, services needed to adapt only by invoicing service users rather than 
local authorities (Wilberforce et al., 2011). As such, there was little effect on the workforce.  
On the other hand, service providers which did experience a loss of service users found it 
frustrating as they had invested in recruiting and training service delivery staff, who were 
no longer required (Wilberforce et al., 2011).  This last effect, of course, is likely to have 
wider negative impact, in that loss of investment can act as a disincentive to further 
investment in staff. A lack of investment in training may reinforce perceptions of disability 
support work as short term, irregular or appropriate for those ‘in between’ other jobs or 
who have few alternatives, undermining potential workforce quality. 
 Increased demand for care at short notice 
As well as potentially decreasing demand for formal care services and increasing the 
vulnerability of organisations to fluctuations in consumer demand, a further impact of 
individualised funding has been that service providers have needed to respond to requests 
made by consumers at short notice and at peak times (Wilberforce et al., 2011).  While 
increasing choice and flexibility is a goal of individualised funding, this could be 
problematic for organisations where consumers are allowed to request or cancel services 
with little notice, or to bank their support hours for later use.  Increased demand for care at 
short notice could result in the increased use of casual, contract and part-time labour, 
contributing to worker vulnerability and lower levels of commitment between workers and 
organisations. 
 Increased administrative burden and higher transaction costs 
UK research has also identified that service provider organisations have faced new cost 
pressures, largely related to the increased administrative requirements associated with 
individualised funding.  The evaluation of the Individual Budget pilots found, for example, 
that individualised funding increased the administration required by service providers, 
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who needed to negotiate and manage a large number of individual contracts with service 
users, rather than a single block grant with local authorities (Wilberforce et al., 2012; 
Wilberforce et al., 2011).  High costs were associated with customising plans and 
administering budgets for low-hours clients in particular (Wilberforce et al., 2011).  
Overall, the administration associated with serving clients receiving an individualised 
payment was found to be costly for organisations, resulting in increases in administrative 
staff and investment in IT systems, and increased efforts in chasing up clients for unpaid 
bills (Wilberforce et al., 2011). 
Research based on interviews with commissioning managers suggested that larger 
agencies appeared, in the process of implementation, to be better protected against the 
financial risks associated with personal budgets, as they had more capacity to manage risks 
of non-payment of bills by clients, and to respond to demands for flexibility (Baxter et al., 
2008). 
It is important to note that a number of these effects on providers – especially in regard to 
reduced certainty and stability - are precisely what would be predicted – and intended – in 
service delivery models such as individualised funding that are based on the concept of 
consumer sovereignty.  However, they are likely to have adverse effects on workers, and 
many of the costs and risks will be passed on. 
Pressures on Workers 
These pressures on service provider organisations have been found to have a substantial 
impact on workers in terms of reductions in pay, hours, and security of tenure, together 
with changes in the pattern of skills and training required.   
 Lower pay 
The financial pressures on service providers noted above have been found to be frequently 
passed onto workers, through cost cutting by organisations, including through paying piece 
rates, or eliminating payments for meetings, training and travel between clients, making it 
difficult for staff to work enough paid hours to make a living wage (Rubery & Urwin, 2010).   
 Outsourcing 
Financial pressures on service provider organisations may also contribute to further 
outsourcing.  Contracting rather than directly employing labour provides opportunities for 
organisations to manage risks by shifting costs onto workers (operating as contractors). 
This can lower hourly rates, and enable the supply of care without basic employment 
protections (Rubery & Urwin, 2010). 
 Reduced hours and security of tenure 
In the UK case, it appears the costs of increased flexibility have been shifted onto 
employees, resulting in workers being offered unsteady or unpredictable hours, and lower 
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pay (Cunningham & Nickson, 2010; Wilberforce et al., 2011). Unsurprisingly, widespread 
concerns about job security arising from personalisation were observed among front-line 
employees (Cunningham & Nickson, 2010). 
In addition, managers in the UK expected increased demand for care at short-notice, and at 
anti-social times of the day, as a result of individual budgets. Regardless of whether it 
eventuated, managers were observed to put plans in place for defensive strategies to alter 
the way staffing was organised in their agencies, often by offering zero hours contracts6 to 
ensure a supply of staff available to work ‘on-call’ (Baxter, Wilberforce, et al., 2011; 
Cunningham & Nickson, 2010; Rubery & Urwin, 2010; Wilberforce et al., 2011).  
 Skills and training 
In addition to requiring a more flexible workforce, individualised funding in the UK was 
also perceived to change the mix of skills required from frontline workers. This has 
included requirements for higher level health skills in the direct care workforce; more 
multi-skilling across health, housing, leisure and employment issues among those in 
frontline roles; and a downgrading of trained and qualified social care practice to focus on 
personal advocacy, brokerage, risk assessment and navigating among multiple through the 
service system (Cunningham & Nickson, 2010, p. 7; Glendinning, 2012, p. 294; UNISON, 
undated).  This has been widely expected to require retraining workers, but also a 
consultation and planning process to establish what staff need to be trained in 
(Cunningham & Nickson, 2010, p. 7; Wilberforce et al., 2011, p. 609).  In Australia, 
consumer-centred approaches have been expected to require higher levels of skills, 
particularly in communication and negotiation to support people with a disability to exert 
choice and control (Adams & Godwin, 2008; Precision Consulting, 2011).  However, while 
on one hand, individualised service models may require staff to be trained in new roles and 
service delivery approaches, on the other, funding models may place training at risk. On-
the-job training and experience may be seen as more important to support roles than 
formal qualifications, and training initiatives may be limited to skilling workers according 
to individual clients’ priorities rather than a more comprehensive suite of transferable 
skills consistent with the professionalization of care work.   
 Health and Safety 
High job stress is a feature of work in disability and aged care, and the wider community 
services sector.  Nationally, the health and community services sector makes up around 10 
percent of the Australian workforce yet it has the highest percentage of workers 
compensation claims for psychological distress, comprising 20 percent of claims (Blewett 
                                                 
6 Zero-hours contracts do not guarantee how many hours a worker will be allocated, nor the 
pattern of hours, so leave workers vulnerable to working fragmented or anti-social hours, 
holding multiple jobs, and accepting excessive or inconvenient shifts due to fear about being 
disadvantaged in future rosters. 
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et al., 2006, p. 12).  Additional risks may arise under consumer-directed care where 
consumers request tasks which challenge the boundaries of OH&S practices, or are not 
anticipated by existing health and safety policies.  In addition, casualisation has been found 
to increase health and safety risks, as contingent workers have been found to be more 
likely to miss out on OH&S training, and to lack sufficient knowledge about how to report 
risks, or to be too concerned about job security to report problems (Aronsson, 1999).  
 
WORKERS IN DIRECT EMPLOYMENT 
Some individualised funding models allow recipients to use personal budgets to directly 
employ or contract their own support staff, such as a personal assistant or attendant, and 
some have allowed direct employment of family members or friends already providing 
unpaid care.  Research and evaluation studies about the impact of these practices have had 
mixed findings.  
Direct Employment and Service Users 
For service users, directly employing or contracting support workers has been found to 
facilitate greater autonomy, enabling the development of better personal relationships, and 
better communication (Leece & Peace, 2010). One English study (Adams & Godwin, 2008) 
found consumers using direct payments to employ personal assistants were more positive 
about them than the care they had previously received through their local authority.  In 
particular, they were more likely to agree they felt listened to, treated with respect, and 
that they completely trusted their support worker (Adams & Godwin, 2008). Consumers 
also reported a lower incidence of problems such as lateness, unexplained absence, neglect 
of duties or tasks, and poor quality care or support.   
The small-scale evaluation of Victoria’s direct employment trial also reported that service 
users were able to more finely tailor their support arrangements, and to design and adjust 
shifts to meet their needs, and that they experienced better communication with their 
support workers (HDG Consulting, 2010). The small number of service users in this study 
(eleven) considered direct employment to be preferable to receiving assistance from staff 
employed in organisations (HDG, 2010).  However, this is unsurprising, as many 
participants opted into the trial due to dissatisfaction with the support they were receiving 
from agencies, including perceptions agency staff had been unsuitable, that they lacked 
flexibility, and had been difficult to retain (HDG Consulting, 2010, p 28-9).  
While direct employment can benefit service users, it has also been found to be difficult and 
burdensome, as the English research shows.  The requirement for consumers to fulfil 
formal obligations as employers can be difficult for some, although most programs appear 
to have supports in place to assist.  In Adams and Godwin’s (2008) study of employment 
under direct payments in England, over a quarter (27 percent) of consumers who 
employed support workers agreed they found being an employer daunting, although this 
feeling appeared to dissipate over time.  UNISON (undated) has also noted it can be 
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problematic for consumers to fulfil the employer role, pointing to a lack of knowledge 
about employment rights, health and safety and training requirements.  The Wiltshire Best 
Value Direct Payments review for example found consumers ill-prepared or supported for 
their employer role, and that they were sometimes unable to pay staff or paid staff late 
(Carmichael & Brown, 2002:803). Glendinning et al (2000) found users of direct payments 
were keen to be good employers overall, but funding levels made it difficult to offer good 
terms of employment, as they needed to bear costs and risks themselves.   
It may be that some service users can perform the role effectively. In the Victorian trial of 
direct employment, for example, all participants who opted into the trial and the evaluation 
reported having previous professional or other experience, such as bookkeeping, 
accounting, or business ownership, that were perceived to have helped them perform the 
employer role effectively (HDG Consulting, 2010: 25). 
Implications of direct employment for care workers 
In some studies, care workers have been reported to prefer, or benefit from, working 
directly for, and with, service users.  Compared with working for an organisation for 
example, time may be less rationed, and so staff may be less rushed when working directly 
for a service user, and able to benefit from better communication and closer relationships 
with employers (Leece & Peace, 2010).  Based on interviews with a small number of service 
managers in Victoria, Laragy and Ottman (2011) reported that some support workers 
preferred to negotiate their conditions and hours directly with their employers.  
However, the literature also points to a set of risks where support workers are engaged 
directly by service users, either as employees or as independent contractors. As discussed 
below, offering work through contracting arrangements alleviates consumers’ 
responsibilities as employers, and removes the protections of the employment relationship.  
In addition, non-existent or ambiguous employment contracts and job descriptions can 
informalise care work, and heighten vulnerability to exploitation; pay and conditions can 
be undermined, especially where funding is inadequate; working hours can be short or 
unpredictable; and training and professional development may not be supported. Health 
and safety standards and access to representation may also be undermined. These risks are 
discussed below. 
 Outsourcing 
As discussed above, organisations may respond to financial pressures by supplying labour 
through contracting rather than employment relationships. Service users wishing to use 
their funding allocation to engage their own staff may also find that engaging an 
independent contractor, rather than directly employing labour, reduces costs and removes 
the responsibilities of the employer role.  However, this removes the employment 
protections available to support workers, and may not comply with laws on sham 
contracting (Fair Work Ombudsman, undated).  
 Contracts and informal employment  
30 
 
In England, much personal assistant employment is not governed by clear employment 
contracts and conditions. A survey of consumers employing staff with direct payments 
found that between 59 and 63 percent of employers did not issue a job description (Adams 
& Godwin, 2008; Glendinning, 2012; Manthorpe et al., 2011).  As Glendinning et al (2000) 
pointed out, the absence of formal agreements about obligations and entitlements can 
exacerbate the vulnerability of personal assistants to exploitation.  
 Employment of family members and friends 
Recipients of individualised funding often recruit staff already known to them, with 
payments often going to those who already provide informal care, but who may have little 
experience of providing formal care services.  In many cases under direct payments in 
England, consumers employed a personal assistant who was a spouse, partner, relative or 
friend: 42 percent did so (Adams & Godwin, 2008). Three fifths (61 percent) employed 
somebody previously known to them (Adams & Godwin, 2008).  Other researchers 
estimated that around half of service users used direct payments to employ family or 
friends (Manthorpe et al., 2011; Stainton & Boyce, 2004).  In any case, clients’ use of family 
and friends, or somebody else known to them, has been considered the norm rather than 
exception, and a key motivation for taking up direct payments (Blyth & Gardner, 2007; 
Leece, 2010).  This may be, at least in part, because family, friends, neighbours or others 
could make brief visits to provide flexible care, often at short notice, compared with 
workers for whom these arrangements may be unattractive (Stainton et al., 2009).   
Adams and Godwin (2008) captured some of these issues in their survey of direct payment 
users and personal assistants in England. They found that around three fifths of employers 
had used direct payments to employ at least one person previously known to them, and at 
the time of the study, 42 percent of employers employed at least one personal assistant 
who was a partner, relative or friend.  This was higher among black and Asian employers 
(page 49). In most cases, partners, relatives or friends were the preferred care workers, 
however, employing family or friends was used in 9 percent of cases as a temporary 
measure, for example, when it was difficult to recruit somebody more suitable (Adams & 
Godwin, 2008).   
Adams and Godwin found that people using Direct Payments to employ personal assistants 
have a preference for hiring someone they know, or that is known by someone they know 
(page 50). This is understandable, given the relational and intimate nature of much 
personal support work. However, there are good reasons why directly employing family 
members and close friends or neighbours may not be ideal. Many of these reasons are 
outlined clearly in the Western Australian Government’s Family Members as Paid Support 
Workers Policy (Disability Services Commission, 2012b).  
The policy makes a clear distinction between carers (those who provide ongoing care and 
assistance and may receive income support under Commonwealth Carer Payment and 
Carer Allowance programs), and support workers, who may be paid under a variety of 
employment/contractual relations. The policy states that Disability Services Commission 
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funding should ‘enhance and supplement informal networks rather than replace them’ 
(Disability Services Commission, 2012b, p. 3). More importantly, the policy outlines a range 
of ways in which employing family members may increase the vulnerability of the person 
with a disability. These include their capacity to exercise genuine choice and have an 
independent voice in relation to their care arrangements, the risk of dependency on the 
family ‘to fulfil all roles and tasks’, the risk of the family member being dependent on the 
person with a disability for an income, lack of respite for the family member taking on the 
role of support worker, and problems with monitoring the extent of support supplied, with 
risks of over-servicing at the family support worker’s expense or under-servicing, at risk to 
the person with a disability’s welfare (Disability Services Commission, 2012b, p. 3). It is 
notable that this policy recognises the problems that close emotional attachment can 
engender when personal and employment relationships become blurred.  
Indeed, this arrangement may be less than ideal if being a family member or friend makes it 
difficult for care workers to leave their role, and if future job prospects are damaged where 
providing familial care is not recognised as valid employment experience (Leece, 2004; 
Ungerson, 2004). 
 Pay and conditions 
In England, working as a personal assistant generates a low income (Adams & Godwin, 
2008, p. 87). Rates of pay are constrained by the amount of government funding received 
by consumers. As Leece (2010, p. 197) found, payment amounts did not allow for travel 
time, pension payments and some forms of leave.  Rates of pay offered to personal 
assistants in the UK were also found not to properly account for the complexity of tasks 
performed, nor the flexible, unsocial or extended hours of assistance required by some 
people with disabilities, causing some directly employed workers to feel exploited 
(Glendinning et al., 2000). Some also avoided obligations to pay national insurance by 
engaging personal assistants for a small number of hours (Land & Himmelweit, 2010). 
Australian evidence is more limited. In Australian pilots, Fisher et al (2010) found workers’ 
pay and conditions tended to be poorly protected, with fieldworkers observing some 
service users were concerned to get the most hours of support possible, by employing staff 
willing to work for below-award rates. The rationale was that funding was insufficient to 
meet their care needs (Fisher et al., 2010).  On the other hand, the evaluation of the 
Victorian trial found direct employment increased income for half of support workers, 
through above award rates or increased hours of work (HDG Consulting, 2010: 43).   
 Working hours 
In-home, community support and respite work involve volatile and unpredictable hours, 
including short shifts in peak periods, seven days a week, and split shifts. In the United 
Kingdom, personal assistants have been found to work very short hours. Adams and 
Godwin (2008) found that under direct payments, 38 percent of personal assistants 
worked fewer than eight hours per week, and 27 percent worked 8 to 16 hours a week.  
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Unsurprisingly 43 percent had other paid employment. Less than half (44 percent) worked 
fixed hours, while 29 percent worked hours which were always variable (Adams & Godwin, 
2008, p. 83).  
Leece (2010) found personal assistants were often called in at short notice by employers. 
Whereas consumers’ emergency or short notice requests would otherwise be mediated by 
agencies, direct employees were contacted directly by employers.  Workers felt responsible 
for clients, and lacked access to substitute staff, so tended to respond to consumer 
demands. As such, personal assistant work has been observed to encroach on home life 
more than home care work for an agency (Leece, 2010, pp. 201-202). 
 Training and professional development 
In the UK, there is no requirement for personal assistants to have minimum qualifications, 
nor do individual budgets cover training and development (Glendinning, 2012, p. 297; 
UNISON, undated). Holders of personal budgets were observed to place low priority on 
previous experience or training, but instead emphasised the importance of on-the-job 
training (Glendinning, 2012, p. 297; Glendinning et al, 2000, p. 207). Adams and Godwin 
(2008, p. 105) report that some consumers directly employing personal assistants with 
direct payments do not see it as their responsibility to train and develop personal 
assistants’ skills, especially where work is considered casual and informal.  However, the 
most common reason employers were unwilling to pay for training was a lack of finance to 
do so.  
Personal assistants have been found to report wanting more opportunities for training, and 
to obtain formal qualifications. Further, as support workers can be asked to do any tasks 
requested by their employers, including basic domestic tasks, it may be difficult for those 
workers with higher level skills to exercise and maintain them (Wilberforce et al, 2011).  
In Australia, access to training has also been identified as a problem associated with direct 
employment. In the Victorian evaluation, support workers reported having less access to 
formal training under direct employment, compared with being employed in an 
organisation (HDG Consulting, 2010).  Analysis of financial data for the trial showed no 
expenditure at all on training. Some service users reported that support staff also worked 
for service provider organisations, and expected staff to receive training through them, or 
independently (HDG Consulting, 2010: 44-45).  
 Health and Safety 
Working on their own in private homes raises challenges for worker health and safety, as 
workers may be asked to perform tasks that go outside what would be acceptable OH&S 
practice within an organisation.  These risks could be exacerbated where consumers have 
very complex needs (for example mental health needs) which raise risks for workers; 
where employment contracts and job descriptions are lacking, or do not govern the pace or 
content of work tasks; or if budget holders’ demands place pressure on workers to perform 
tasks they consider unreasonable, or which are illegal (Manthorpe et al., 2011, p. 200).  
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Relationships may become abusive or otherwise distressing and can be difficult to handle 
when isolated from the professional, managerial and collegial supports or organisational 
employment, and where personal assistants are migrant care workers, and isolated from 
support networks (Land & Himmelweit, 2010, p. 34).  In the complete absence of an OH&S 
framework, consumer-driven preferences for lifting and caring techniques may also expose 
workers to increased musculoskeletal injury (Dellve et al., 2003). 
 Discrimination 
As consumers tend to hire people who share ethnic or other characteristics with them, 
when service users recruit their own staff, racism and other prejudices may play a role in 
hiring and firing decisions (Stevens et al, 2012).  The risks are greater where employers are 
poorly informed and supported to fulfil their responsibilities as employers. 
 Representation 
Where individual support workers perform their work in the homes of their employers, 
directly employed support workers are isolated from other workers, and studies have 
shown they express desires for more contact with colleagues (Glendinning, 2000:207). In 
private homes, unions’ right of entry may not be straightforward.  Isolation mean workers 
are difficult for unions to access, undermining knowledge of rights, and capacity to organise 
for better conditions.  Thus, at the same time that workers have a greater need for 
representation given the new risks they face in relation to working conditions, they are less 
likely to be able to obtain it.  
Summary 
In general the evidence indicates that individualised funding schemes create a number of 
risks and uncertainties for workers. For those who are employed by organisations, there is 
evidence that organisations have passed many of the risks associated with increased 
flexibility onto workers, responding, for example, to increases in short notice requests with 
a casualised, on-call workforce, for whom there appear few offsetting benefits.   
Where service users engage staff through direct employment or contracting arrangements, 
some studies have emphasised benefits in that some workers may feel less rushed than 
when time is rationed by an agency, and that workers sometimes appreciate the directly 
negotiating hours and other conditions with consumers.  However, as the evidence outlined 
shows, the risks associated with contracting and direct employment are substantial, and 
these outweigh the limited benefits for some. In the next section, we summarise the risks 
which emerged from our analysis. 
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Summary of employment risks 
 
The capacity of the service system to foster the capabilities, wellbeing and participation of 
people with disabilities; and to assist them to take more control in defining and meeting 
their own support needs, depends on a high capacity and skilled workforce.  Yet work in 
disability services is characterised by low pay and insecurity.  As the previous sections 
have shown, unless carefully designed and implemented, individualised funding may 
exacerbate these problems, bringing further risks to service quality and the continuity of 
care. This section summarises the risks identified for disability support workers employed 
by organisations or consumers, or those engaged through contracting arrangements. In 
doing, so, we identify the main risks for working conditions, and the capacity for the service 
system to provide quality care in the context of individualised funding.  These risks relate 
to job security; income security; opportunities to gain, use and retain skills; access to 
healthy and safe work environments; and rights to voice and representation.   
 
SERVICE CONTINUITY AND JOB SECURITY  
Issues for workers in organisations:   
 Job loss as service users opt out of organisationally provided services 
 Loss of direct care functions if organisations redirect resources to non-direct care 
functions such as administration and planning and managing funds 
 Increased casual employment in response to fluctuations in consumer demand 
 Increase in unsteady, unpredictable, anti-social hours as services respond to 
increases in short notice requests and consumer banking of hours 
 May lack a formal employment contract or have a non-existent or changing job 
description, especially in small organisations 
Issues for contractors 
 No employment contract 
 Job description may be non-existent or changing 
 No guarantee of regular hours or ongoing work 
 Lack of access to severance pay  
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Issues for workers in direct employment: 
 No formal employment contracts 
 Non-existent or changing job description 
 Employer discrimination, including racism, in hiring and firing decisions 
 Lack of access to severance pay 
 May be difficult for employed family members to leave 
 
INCOME SECURITY 
Issues for workers in organisations:   
 Low wages 
 Threat of further reductions in wages and other payments, including through the 
use of piece rates, and the loss of payments for meetings and travel 
 Unpredictable pay where hours fluctuate 
 Loss of income if consumer is hospitalised or dies, especially in small organisations 
Issues for contractors 
 Pay and conditions may fall below award levels 
 Unpredictable hours and pay 
 Inability to achieve a decent wage, especially if hours available are very short 
 Increased responsibility for individually negotiating conditions 
 Increased personal responsibility for financial management, including invoicing 
clients and recovering debt 
 Risk of underpayment or late payment 
 No paid leave 
 Loss of income if client is hospitalised or dies 
 Personal responsibility for managing multiple contracting arrangements and clients  
 May be difficult to ensure compliance with sham contracting laws 
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Issues for workers in direct employment: 
 Low wages, especially where government funding provided to consumers is 
inadequate 
 Increased responsibility for individually negotiating conditions with no increase in 
bargaining power 
 Increased personal responsibility for financial management, including recovering 
unpaid wages 
 Attempts to employ staff at below-award rates and conditions 
 Inability to achieve a decent wage if hours available are very short 
 Underpayment or late payment of wages 
 Difficult to use leave without access to substitute staff  
 Loss of income if employer is hospitalised or dies 
 Multiple job holding, and the need to manage multiple employers, employment 
arrangements and conditions  
 
OPPORTUNITIES TO GAIN, USE AND RETAIN SKILLS 
Issues for workers in organisations:   
 Need for higher level skills, and multi-skilling in some aspects of the work 
 Downgrading of direct care practice where work refocuses on brokerage, 
assessment and navigating the service system 
 Limited access to non-mandatory training 
 Growth in lower skill positions 
 Turnover may provide a disincentive for organisations to invest in training 
Issues for contractors  
 Responsible for own training 
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 Skills developed through on-the-job, consumer-specific training only, rather than 
formal training 
 May be difficult to access opportunities to perform tasks that maintain higher level 
skills 
 Future employers may not recognise providing care for family members to be valid 
experience 
 Lack of access to professional supervision 
 Lack of access to learn from colleagues  
Issues for workers in direct employment: 
 No budget for training 
 Emphasis on on-the-job, consumer-specific training rather than formal training 
 May be difficult to access opportunities to perform tasks that maintain higher level 
skills 
 Future employers may not recognise providing care for family members to be valid 
experience 
 
A HEALTHY AND SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT 
Issues for workers in organisations:   
 Increased pressure to perform tasks as directed by clients, some of which may not 
be in accordance with health and safety requirements 
 Increased pace and intensity of work 
 Over-work  
 Poor work-life balance  
Issues for contractors  
 No OH&S framework to guide practice 
 Increased pressure to perform tasks as directed by clients, some of which may not 
be in accordance with health and safety requirements 
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 Undermining of health and safety where employers do not understand or respect 
responsibilities and legal obligations 
 No professional supervision 
 Over-work  
 Poor work-life balance  
 Lack of access to social support from colleagues 
Issues for workers in direct employment: 
 No OH&S framework to guide practice 
 Increased pressure to perform tasks as directed by clients, some of which may not 
be in accordance with health and safety requirements 
 Undermining of health and safety where employers do not understand or respect 
responsibilities and legal obligations 
 No professional supervision 
 Over work  
 Poor work-life balance  
 Risk of bullying and abuse 
 Family members providing paid care may be at risk of over-servicing, and may lack 
access to respite  
 
RIGHTS TO VOICE AND REPRESENTATION 
Issues for workers in organisations:   
 Diminished voice and workplace power through casualisation 
 Isolation of workers 
 Difficult to inform workers of rights as workforce dispersed  
Issues for contractors  
 Isolation of workers 
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Issues for workers in direct employment: 
 Isolation of workers 
 Difficult to inform workers of rights as workforce dispersed  
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Promoting service quality and workforce capacity 
 
As the section above summarised, individualised funding models present risks to 
employment standards and workers’ rights, and compromises the continuity and quality of 
care. This section draws together the findings from the review to suggest some policy 
objectives, and associated strategies, for protecting against these threats, and promoting 
employment standards and standards of service quality in the context of individualised 
funding.  
 
IMPROVING GOVERNMENT FUNDING 
The effectiveness of disability support policies depends as much on the level of resources 
available to fund support measures as it does on the design of those measures themselves. 
With the introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme requiring an increase in 
the size of the disability workforce, levels of funding that cover the full cost of service 
provision are required, including decent wages, and the costs of training, recruitment, 
leave, and superannuation.  These are necessary to ensure a flow of workers can be pulled 
into the industry, and the existing workforce can be retained.  
 
ENSURING THE SUSTAINABILITY OF SERVICE PROVIDER ORGANISATIONS 
If service users could access care from funded organisations that better met and responded 
to their needs, fewer would perceive cash payments, and direct employment or contracted 
care, to be necessary.  As such, support to maintain the sustainability of service provider 
organisations, and their capacity to achieve outcomes for service users can help keep jobs 
in organisations.   
A key goal should be to avoid the development of a market consisting of a multitude of 
atomised and inexperienced employers, which would be extremely costly to monitor and 
regulate.  Government funding to ensure basic infrastructure and administrative capacity 
of service provider organisations would help them remain sustainable, and to properly 
fulfil their roles as responsible and compliant employers.  
 
MINIMISING THE ROLE OF CASH PAYMENTS  
The approaches to personalisation examined indicate that goals of consumer choice and 
control can be achieved through other models, including through user-centred planning, 
notional funding allocations and other alternatives which minimise the role of direct cash 
41 
 
payments and direct employment, and which maintain organisational capacity to respond 
to, and advocate for, consumer need.   
 
AVOIDING & MANAGING DIRECT EMPLOYMENT 
Many of the risks identified in the literature would be managed by altogether avoiding the 
model of direct employment, that is, by facilitating consumer choice and control while 
maintaining employment of support staff in organisations.  Where direct employment is 
allowed, the capacity of consumers to be employers, and the working conditions that can be 
offered, should be carefully regulated. Significant resources are required to ensure 
employers understand their responsibilities as employers around wages, leave, health, and 
safety, and to monitor and ensure compliance.  Initiatives could include compulsory 
induction and training before commencing as an employer, and ongoing support.  Where 
direct employment is allowed, workers will need access to information, complaint 
mechanisms, and union representation. 
Alternative organisational models, such as localised cooperatives, may also provide a ways 
to mediate some of the negative implications individualised funding for workers, for 
example, by providing access to leave cover, training and support, and to living wages and 
leave (Myers & Cato, 2011).  In the United Kingdom however, without infrastructure 
support, social care cooperatives have required additional funding from clients, and 
volunteer labour, as direct payment rates have not fully covered costs (Fisher et al., 2011). 
 
AVOIDING & MANAGING CONTRACTING ARRANGEMENTS 
Consumer-centred funding may facilitate an increase in the contracting of support workers, 
either by organisations or consumers. These arrangements offer consumers and service 
providers opportunities to manage risk, minimise costs and achieve flexibility. However, 
they place workers outside the employment protection frameworks, and are likely to 
undermine workforce investment, and the continuity and quality of care.  In some cases, 
contracting arrangements may be inappropriate and illegal, and monitoring compliance 
with independent contracting laws is likely to be extremely costly.  Ensuring adequate 
government funding will help ensure the costs of decent employment conditions can be 
covered, and reduce the pressure on organisations and consumers to contract for care. 
 
AVOIDING EMPLOYMENT OF FAMILY MEMBERS 
Employment of family and friends can be a key motivation for taking up direct payments 
(Blyth & Gardner, 2007; Leece, 2010), and this is understandable, given the relational and 
intimate nature of much personal support work. However, there are good reasons why 
directly employing family members and close friends or neighbours may not be ideal. 
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These arrangements may displace unpaid assistance and result in less care overall 
(Productivity Commission, 2011, p. G.9). Employing family members may also compromise 
the capacity of consumers to freely and independently exercise choice and voice, and risk 
the family member depending on the person with a disability for income, with limited 
access to respite.  Arrangements may also be difficult for paid workers to leave, and future 
job prospects could be damaged if the work is not recognised as valid experience (Leece, 
2004; Ungerson, 2004). 
 
MANAGING DEMANDS FOR FLEXIBILITY 
Where organisations and individuals must respond to fluctuations in consumer demand, 
such as requests made by consumers at short notice or at peak times, funding should allow 
that providers charge a premium for meeting these needs, to ensure workers can be paid 
penalty rates.  Organisations should also be properly resourced in ways that allow them to 
respond to fluctuating levels of demand in ways that do not rely on casual staff.  
 
WORKFORCE PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT 
The introduction of the National Disability Insurance Scheme should be introduced with a 
coherent national workforce planning and development strategy, developed collaboratively 
with workers and their representatives, government agencies, employers, and service 
users.  This should also include monitoring of workforce capacity and change.  Indeed, 
COAG (2012, p 34) has identified the need to progress a national workforce strategy for 
disability services.  
 
BUILDING ALLIANCES WITH SERVICE USERS AND PROVIDERS 
Workers’ rights could be promoted by emphasising the links between working conditions 
and care quality for service users, and strengthening alliances with service users, service 
provider organisations, and their peak bodies. Although their interests may not always 
align, care workers and care recipients share a common interest in quality of care, and 
therefore in the way care markets, and the care workforce, are managed.  Commonalities 
may be strengthened if threats to the workforce are framed as threats to service quality. 
 
INVOLVING SUPPORT WORKERS IN RESEARCH AND EVALUATION 
Research and evaluation studies have focused primarily on service users’ experiences, and 
the outcomes of individualised funding in empowering consumers. Where care workers’ 
perspectives have been explored, it has often been through managers’ or policy officials’ 
perspectives, rather than those of care workers themselves.  Better monitoring of the 
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workforce in the context of individualised funding would improve capacity to develop 
appropriate models.  
 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that sufficient – and significant – resources will need to be devoted to the task of 
meeting the stated aims of disability policy in Australia in a way that maintains the 
independence and dignity of people with disabilities, their families and paid workers who 
provide support.   
The National Disability Insurance Scheme is being introduced in a context in which there is 
already strong evidence of recruitment and retention difficulties stemming from decades of 
under-investment, low pay, and insecure working conditions.  Without recognition of the 
role of the workforce in a quality service system and initiatives to ensure workforce 
planning and appropriate models of regulation, it is unlikely that either goals of national 
system expansion, or standards of service continuity and quality for consumers, will be 
met.   
People with disabilities rightly expect support services to meet their needs flexibly, 
respectfully, and in ways that fundamentally attend to their individuality. Controlling an 
amount of money is one way of providing access to such services – a way with considerable 
risks for both the person needing services and the people providing them. Voice and choice 
for people with disabilities can be developed in collaborative arrangements within service 
organisations that, by enabling the sharing of skills, resources, and infrastructure, can 
provide high quality individualised support along with the high quality jobs that underpin 
that support.  
Overall, this report recommends what has been called a ‘high road’ strategy for care work 
reform (Folbre, 2006). Such a strategy may involve some higher costs in the short term, but 
in the intermediate and longer terms will lead to more sustainable and higher quality 
service delivery, better outcomes for people with disabilities, and a more efficient and cost-
effective system of care.   
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